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HEEDLESS GLOBALISM: THE SEC'S ROAD MAP TO 
ACCOUNTING CONVERGENCE 
William W. Bratton* 
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has introduced a 
"Roadmap" that describes a process leading to mandatory use of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by domestic 
issuers by 2014. The SEC justifies this initiative on the grounds that 
global standardization yields cost savings and an ultimate gain in 
comparability, facilitating the search for global opportunities by u.s. 
investors and making u.s. capital markets more attractive to foreign 
issuers. This Article shows that the offered justification is inadequate. 
The SEC frames the matter as a choice between two institutional 
Fameworks for standard setting, holding out high quality sets of 
standards, asking which choice reduces Fictions in global securities 
markets. Global market frictions are not the only stakes on the table. 
The two systems, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and IFRS, hold out materially different accounting treatment and the 
differences matter to domestic reporting companies and domestic 
users offinancial statements. GAAP tends to constrain, where IFRS is 
flexible. GAAP's constraints reflect normative choices, in particular 
preferences for conservatism, ver�fiability and transparent disclosure 
of current period results. It follows that the Roadmap poses a 
normative choice. What the SEC presents as an investor-driven 
initiative in fact abandons an investor-protective institutional 
arrangement of more than three decades' duration and holds out costs 
for investors and incidental benefits for corporate managers and 
auditing .firms. This Article concludes the Roadmap should be 
withdrawn and the SEC should return to the point of departure-the 
ongoing Financial Accounting Standards Board-International 
Accounting Standards Board convergence project. 
INTRODUCTION 
International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS) swept the globe! 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
I.  For an account of this, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accoul1ling Vision: 
A Realistic Appraisal 0(0 Qllixotic Quest. 87 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2008) [here ina fter Cunni ngham, SEC's 
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even as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) retained 
the ir hold over reporting companies and securities markets in the United 
States .  However, the g lobalization trend continues to rise and GAAP' s  
days could be numbered as well as those of its generator, the F inancial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) . The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), long the backer and protector of GAAP and the 
FASB, lately changed course, defecting against them in favor of IFRS 
and its generator, the International Accounting Standards Board (lASB) .  
The road to  defection began when the SEC eliminated the requirement 
that foreign issuers registered in the U .S .  and reporting under IFRS 
restate their financials to GAAP. 2 The political and economic logic of 
globalization took over from there. In 2007, the SEC proposed 
extending the reporting option under IFRS to U . S .  issuers. 3 The SEC 
claimed that option would afford competitive advantages to  U .S .  issuers 
with extensive operations abroad.4 However, the commentators pushed 
back,s arguing that the value of global convergence in accounting 
standards l ies in enhanced comparabi lity across the financials of 
different issuers .o Accordingly, admitting two competing accounting 
systems into the domestic market would only retard progress toward the 
goal . The SEC responded in 2008 by admitting the policy salience of 
comparabi l ity and doubling its bet on IFRS : it produced a "Roadmap" 
that describes a process leading to mandatory use of IFRS by domestic 
issuers beginning in 20 1 4 . 7 The Roadmap bypasses an alternative, more 
painstaking route to convergence-a longstanding j oint proj ect of the 
F ASB and the IASB directed to the articulation of a common set of 
s accounting standards .' 
Glohal Accounling Vision]. 
2. Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepured in Accordance 
With International Financial Reporting Swndards Without Reconciliation to U . S .  G A A P. Securities Act 
Release No. 8879, Exchange Act Release No. 57,026. 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008 ) .  
3. Concept Release 011 Allowing U.S .  Issuers t o  Prepare Financ ial Statements in Accordance 
with Intem<ltional Financ ial Reporting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 883 1 ,  Exch,mge Act 
Release No. 56,2 1 7, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (Aug. 14, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Concept Release]. 
4. Id. at 45,602-03. 
5. For criticism of this position, see Cunningham, SEC ' .I'  Glohal Accounling Vision, supm note 
I, at 26-27 (contending that effective competition presupposes full infonnation and that the I A S B  has a 
practice of misrepresenting the contents of {FRS and that widespread adoption of I F R S  signals a 
nationa l-level rreference for comparab ility over compet i tion). 
6. See id. at 27-28. 
7. Roadmap for the Potential use of Financial  Statements Prepared in Accordance With 
International Financ ial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 89 82, Exchange 
Act Release No. 5 8,960, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (proposed Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Roadmap]. 
8. See IFRS FOUNDATION, A ROADMAP FOR CONVERGENCE BETWEEN IFRSS AND US GAA P-·-
2006-2008: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE F ASB AND TilE IASB (2006), available 
01 http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63 FB-56DB-4B78-B7 AF-49BBA 1 8C98 D9/0/MoU.pdf. 
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The SEC ' s  reports respecting these convergence InItIatives talk the 
g lobalization talk, extol ling the benefits of convergence. They say that 
standardization yields cost savings9 and that a single global set of 
reporting standards yields an ultimate gain in comparability . 10 Both of 
which facilitate the search for global opportunities by U .S .  investors 11 
and make U .S .  capital markets more attractive to foreign issuers. 12 But, 
as so often is the case with globalization talk, important points are left 
out. Two of these points are discussed in this Article. 13 
First, the proposed change is not merely a matter of choosing the 
institutional framework for standard setting. The accounting treatments 
themselves are at issue, treatments that for the most part concern 
domestic reporting companies and domestic users of financial 
statements. This may seem obvious . But the Roadmap spends only 
three of its 1 65 pages comparing IFRS to GAAP. 1 4 This Article takes 
the occasion to fill-in some missing details, highlighting some normative 
implications of a switch to IFRS. 
The familiar debate over the relative merits of rules and principles 
captures many of the matters at stake in the choice of treatments, which 
leads to this Artic le's second point. The rules versus principles 
comparison only has meaning within a specific context, which includes 
the compliance environment as well as the political and interest group 
alignments surrounding the standard-setter. 15 These matters tend to be 
assumed away in recent globalization discussions . The discussants treat 
standard-setter independence as an accomplished fact on both sides of 
the Atlantic, an assumption that became widespread after the lASB was 
reorganized during the last decade to acquire a governance structure that 
closely resembles the FASB's  structure . 16 However, politics does not 
retreat so easily. To underscore this point, this Article recounts the three 
decade history of the FASB, showing that the F ASB maintained its 
9 .  2007 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 45,604. 
1 0. Id. at 45,606; 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7. at 70,823. 
II. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,8 1 8 . 
1 2 .  Jd. at 70,824 (asserting that a U.S. dual standard "may create challenges in the U.S. capital 
markets"). 
13. For discllssion of additional points, see Cunningham. SEC's Clohal Accullntillg Vision, supra 
note I .  
1 4. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,826-27. 
1 5 . See' genera!!" Lawrence A. Cunningham. A Prescription to Retire Ihe Rhetoric 0/ 
'Principles-Based Systems" in Corporate L(l1\', Securities Regulatioll (//1(1 Acco/lIlting, 60 V AND. L. 
REV. 1 4 1 I (2007) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire Ihe Rhetoric 1)/ Principles-Based 
S\'stems ]. 
1 6 . For a discussion of the governance issues and process that led to LASB's reorganization, see 
David S. Ruder et aI., Crealioll 0/ J,,",or/d Wide Accouniing S{and(/rd�: COI1l'f'lgence lind Indepelldence, 
25 Nw. J. INT'L L .  & Bus. 5 1 3 , 526-54 (2005). 
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independence despite opposition from corporate management. As an 
independent FASB formulated more standards, management 
experienced a steady diminution of its zone of financial reporting 
discretion. The F ASB won out only because of consistent protection 
from the SEC. A switch to IFRS assures no comparable protective 
structure . 
Ironically, a switch to IFRS would also allow management to reclaim 
some of the lost territory while simultaneously enhancing rents collected 
by its auditors. Thus the Roadmap sends an imp licit political s ignal: 
The interest group alignment that protected the FASB,  which was 
comprised of the SEC and investors in the financial markets (termed 
"users" in accounting contexts), disintegrated. I f  the SEC chooses 
mandated IFRS, destroying or materially impairing the FASB,  then audit 
firms and corporate issuers (termed "preparers" in accounting contexts) 
ultimately will  benefit, potentially resulting in negative effects on 
domestic investors . 
Part I of this Article provides the background information, 
specifically describing the F ASB-IASB convergence initiative and the 
SEC ' s  Roadmap . Part I I  analyzes the differences in accounting 
treatments under GAAP and IFRS, highlighting the two systems ' 
different normative roots . Part I I I  further describes the context in which 
GAAP evolved, showing how interest group politics shaped the F ASB' s 
standard setting. Part IV shows that the Roadmap 's  shift to the global 
framework by itself will not denude accounting's standard-setting of 
political salience. Accordingly, it follows that the Roadmap makes its 
global projections on an implausible set of assumptions. 
I. ALTERNATE ROUTES TO CONVERGENCE 
The SEC Roadmap holds out an expressway to global accounting 
convergence. A slower road opened in 2002 , when the FASB and the 
IASB coordinated their operations to develop a "compatible" set of 
standards. 1 7  Work commenced immediately, but progress s lowed. The 
F ASB and the IASB issued a j oint progress report in February 2006, 
tenned the "Memorandum of Understanding." As updated in 2008,18 it 
reports completion of joint standards in only one subject matter area: 
bus iness combinations. Projects in nine other areas were reported as 
1 7 . See Press Release, FASB and IA SB Agree to Work Together Toward Convergence of Global 
Accounting Slandards (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www . fasb.org/ncws/nrI02902.shll11. 
18. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., COMPLETING 
THE FEBRUARY 2006 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: A PROGRE SS RE PORT AND T IMETABLE FOR 
COMPLETION (2008), available at http://www.fasb.orglinIIlMOU_09- 1 I -OS.pdf. 
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ongoing with completion projected for most in either 2010 or 2011.]9 
These include financial instruments, financial statement presentation, 
leases, liabilities and equity distinctions, revenue recogmtIOn, 
consolidation, de-recognition, fair value measurements, and retiree 
benefits. One other topic, intangible assets, has been dropped entirely. 
Meanwhile, the 2011 completion target seems more hopeful than 
realistic.2o 
Whatever the timetable, the F ASB-IASB initiative does not 
contemplate the emergence of identical standards. "Compatibility" 
instead means a reduction of distance between the two separate systems. 
Even so, the distance between the two regimes can be expected to shrink 
steadily, given an institutionalized working relationship between the two 
boards . There also could be synergistic benefits from their continued 
coexistence. By hypothesis, two world-class standard-setterss that focus 
both unilateral ly and collaboratively on the entire range of reporting 
issues could, over time, articulate better sets of standards than would a 
single agency. 
However, long-term prospects for collaborative benefits appeal only 
to a patient observer. Unfortunately, patience ran out on Chairman 
Christopher Cox. The Roadmap moots exclusive use of IFRS on a 
tentative, but rapid timetable. The first key date is 2011, when the SEC 
is scheduled to decide whether IFRS wil l  be used exclusively. If the 
SEC affirms I FRS exclusivity, the Roadmap proj ects that that phase will 
be completed by 2014 for large filers,2] by 2015 for mid-sized fi lers, and 
by 2016 for small fi lers .22 The Roadmap notes that the transition will 
entail costs, but leaves the matter for later consideration as a factor in the 
SEC 's yea or nay decision in 2011.23 
The Roadmap notes a number of residual problems. One is a general 
lack of familiarity with IFRS among American preparers and auditors. 24 
For this Article ' s  purpose, a more important problem is the institutional 
shortcomings at the IASB.  Its members are selected by an independent 
foundation, the International Accounting Standards Committee 
Foundation (IASCF),  which consists of constituents and a monitoring 
advisory body composed of constituents. Structured in this manner, the 
19. lei. 
20. A review of the reports on these initiatives posted on the F ASB website as of December 2009 
does not appear to note any signiticant recent progress toward completion. See also Letter from Jack T. 
Ciesielski, Investors Technical Advisory Comm., to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.s. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 20,2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708.shtmL 
21. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,823. 
22. lei. at 70,824. 
23. A study has been commissioned from the Office of the Chief Accountant. lei. 
24. Id at 70,822-23. 
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IASB is a carbon copy of the FASB except with a larger cast of 
characters and geographic distribution requirements.25 Two points of 
distinction between the two organizations remain-money and publ ic 
sector oversight. 
As to money, the IASB is funded through voluntary contributions by 
constituents worldwide, including auditing firms ,  corporate issuers, 
international organizations, central banks, and governments. 26 
Accordingly, questions arise about its independence. The F ASB was 
voluntarily funded for most of its history, but it achieved fiscal 
independence in 2002 with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX). SOX changed the framework of federal recognition of GAAP, 
requiring that a recognized standard-setter be whol ly funded by fees 
levied on reporting companies by the federal government. 27 The F ASB 
duly applied for recognition and became publicly funded upon the 
S EC's approval of the appl ication. 28 
The Roadmap cautions that mandated IFRS will  come only "after the 
IASC Foundation reaches its goal of securing a stable funding 
mechanism" that supports independent operation. 29 We are not told 
what such a mechanism might look like. Meanwhile, a look at the 
budget set out in the IASCF's  2008 Annual Report confilms the 
existence of a problem. The IASB ' s 2009 budget was projected to be 
£ 1 7 mil l ion . 30 Of this, the European Commission (EC) donated the 
largest single sum, £4 mill ion . The next tranche of funds came from 
twenty-two nationally-based sources, many of them private donors 
"coordinated" by governments or securities regulators. Of these, the 
U.S .  is the largest, producing £2.4 million from a coalition of 
uncoordinated private companies. I t  is followed by Japan at £1.9 
million and Germany at £ 1.2 million, with private but coordinated 
money in both cases .  The cumulated EC and national contributions did 
25. See 2007 Concept Release, slipra note 3, at 45,605; Ruder et al.. slipra note 16, at 519-20; 
see also INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L ACCOUNTING STA NDAR DS COMM. FOUND., WHO 
WE ARE AND WHAT WE Do (20 I 0), available (II http://www.iasplus.com/iascf/whoweare.pdf. 
26. See 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,821. 
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, § lOS, 116 Stat. 745, 768· 69 (codified at 
15 U.S.c. § 77s (2006) . 
28. The IASB does not yet meet the criteria established under the SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204. 
§§ 108(b)-109, 116 Stat. 745, 768 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 77s. 7219 (2006), for SEC 
recognition, because it is not funded by congressionally levied fees. For discussion of other possible 
problems under the requirements, see Cunningham, SEC '.I' Global ACC()lIlllillg Vis i() Il , supra note I .  at 
29-·33. 
29. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,821. 
30. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FO UND., ANNU,\L REPORT 2008 15 (2009), 
amilahle 01 http://www.ifi·s.org/NRlrdonlyres/90CC93BF·581 B-44DA·I3685-C0503CC24A69/0/ 
IASCFannualreport2008.pdf. 
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not cover the lASB ' s  budget. It made ends meet for 2009 only as the 
result of a £5.5 mil lion commitment by the Big Four accounting firms.3! 
Red flags unfurl accordingly : accounting standards bear critically on the 
audit process, and hence, audit finn earnings . 
As to public oversight, the lASB also falls short as compared to the 
FASB .  The FAS B ' s  parent, the F inancial Accounting Foundation 
(F AF), is overseen by the SEC. Indeed, the F ASB itself has long 
maintained a close working relationship with the SEC's  accounting 
office.32 The lASCF, in contrast, has operated free of government 
oversight, implying a gap in publ ic accountab i lity. Thus, the lASCF has 
mooted the fonnation of an international publ ic sector monitoring group . 
The SEC Roadmap, in tum, contemplates that the monitoring group will  
be running by the t ime of its projected switch to IFRS . The lASB' s  
constitution has been amended to  allow for a monitoring board made up 
of two representatives from the International Organization of Securit ies 
Commissions and one from each of the European Union, the SEC, the 
Japan financial services agency, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. This monitoring board ' s  role is to be determined later. Its 
present job description is  ambiguous: the board wil l  be "linked" to the 
IASCF, wil l  "participate" in IASCF trustee nominations, and will 
"advise" the IASCF.33 The SEC promises to evaluate the effectiveness 
of th is  arrangement in the course of its trip down the Roadmap . 
Whatever the outcome, the lASB will  remain several steps further 
removed from government oversight than has been the FASB.  
The SEC implicitly acknowledged the Roadmap' s shortcomings in  a 
follow-up report. 34 This announced that the staff of the Office of the 
Chief Accountant will be developing a "Work Plan,,35 addressing a 
number of unsolved problems, in particular levels of knowledge about 
IFRS, gaps in the coverage . of IFRS, human capital readiness, 
auditabil ity, and comparabi lity .36 The report leaves the 2011 decision 
date in place even as it moves back the expected initial implantation date 
from 2014 to 2015 or 2016. It also returns the spotlight to the FASB-
3 \ .  ld. at 16-18. 
32. Set' ill/i'" note 94 and accompanying text. 
33. See INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION: 
REPORT OF THE IASC FOUNDATION TRUSTEES ON PART I OF THEIR REVIEW 6-7 (2009), ami/ah!.: a/ 
http://www.ifrs.org/NRJrdonlyres/573E48C3-521 C -449E-985F-9A 7131 CDAC 17/0/ 
ConstitutionReviewPI May09.pdf. 
34. Commission Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards. 
Securities Act Release No. 9109, Exchange Act Release No. 61.578, 75 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. :2.2010), 
(/mi/ah/e (1/ http://www.sec. govlrules/other!20 I 0/33-91 09 .pdf. 
35. Id at 9497. 
36. Jd at 9497-98. 
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IASB convergence project, on the theory that its successful completion 
will ameliorate problems with the tenns of IFRS.  37 This is a step in the 
right direction. But, as this Article indicates, abandoning the Roadmap 
entirely remains the better course. 
II. COMPARING TREATMENTS UNDER GAAP AND IFRS 
The Roadmap's policy framework suffers from a fundamental 
shortcoming. The Roadmap contemplates a choice between two "high 
quality" standard-setters and two "high quality" systems, viewing the 
systems themselves as givens and characterizing them only in the most 
general tenns. 38 In the Roadmap's thumbnail sketch, IFRS is described 
as "not as prescriptive as" GAAP and as holding out "a greater amount 
of options" for issuers while providing "a relatively lesser amount of 
guidance. ,
, 39 The SEC notes that this "greater optionality" could detract 
from consistency and comparabi l ity, in addition to making l i tigation and 
enforcement outcomes harder to predict. 40 At the same time, the SEC 
indicates that relaxed prescription may make it easier for issuers to 
account for transactions m accordance with their underlying . 4 1  economIcs.  
Thus framed, the choice is one between rules and principles, with the 
SEC taking the occasion to advocate principles. 42 The Roadmap ' s  
framing pre-ordains the bottom line cost-benefit conclusion: Principles 
are better, therefore, IFRS is cost-beneficial for everybody; throw in 
additional cost savings from convergence, and the matter can only be 
decided in favor of IFRS. Essentially, we are told that the choice 
between two complex regulatory regimes can be decided without 
reference to their more particular tenns. 
There must be more to it than that. Some of what is missing is 
apparent on the Roadmap's face. It  tells us that a principles-based 
approach opens up issuer discretion respecting treatments, which 
sacrifices comparabi l ity across issuers. The Roadmap simultaneously 
asserts that convergence enhances comparab ility .  Taking the two points 
together, it would seem to fol low that the enhancement of international 
37. ld at 9498. 
38. See generally 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7. 
39. Id. at 70,826. 
40. lei. 
41. Jd 
42. For a more detailed discussion of SEC pronouncements articulated under previous SEC 
leadership. see Cunningham, A Prescription t o  Retire the Rhetoric of" Principles-Based Systems, supra 
note 15. at 1 446-53. 
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comparability held out by the Roadmap implies a countervail ing 
sacrifice of comparability in the domestic context as issuers use 
principles to devise more idiosyncratic treatments . The SEC 's  stated 
goal of greater transparency accordingly appears elusive with gains on 
the one hand, implying losses on the other. 43 The comparability 
problem is compounded if we add a point-IFRS in practice is not a 
unitary international system, but an international focal point around 
which a broad range of national systems converge as national regulators 
adopt IFRS with local carve outS . 44 
Differences of opinion about treatments continue to matter even 
within the world of I FRS . To get a better handle on the stakes from a 
U .S .  perspective, consider some classic cases where GAAP is famous 
for rules while IFRS is known for its principles .45 
Consider first accounting for capital leases-long-term leases that 
must be booked on the lessee's balance sheet. GAAP uses four defined 
criteria, including one by-the-numbers test keyed to the useful life of the 
asset under lease, with the criteria determining the treatment. 46 IFRS 
bids the reporting company to look to the economics of the transaction, 
including eight factors to assist its determination without stipulating 
results following from their appl ication. 47 It bears noting that while 
IFRS is indeed more flexible, the GAAP treatment, founded on a list of 
factors, does not automatically determine results. American lawyers 
would describe both treatments as "standards ." 
Next, consider accounting consolidation, probably the most often 
cited case of GAAP as rules and IFRS as principles. Under both GAAP 
and IFRS, when one firm "controls" another, both repOli on a 
43. See Lawrence A. Cunningham. Editorial. Belvare the Temptation 0/ Global Standards. FIN. 
Ti:vtES (London), Sept. I I, 2007. at II. 
44. To see this point in a discussion critical of the Roadmap. see Lettcr from Kurt N. Schacht, 
Managing Director. CFA Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. Integrity. & Gcrald I. White, Chairman, CFA Inst. , to 
Florencc Hannon. Acting Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3 (Apr. 20. 2009), Gl'uilable at 
http://w\Vw. scc.gov!comments!s7-27-08/s72708-162.pdf. 
45. For lists of differcnces between GAAP and [FRS, see, for example, BARRY 1. EpSTEIN & 
EVA K. JERMAKOWICZ. IFRS 2008: INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF INTERl'<ATlONAL FINANCIAL 
REPORTING ST ANDAROS app'x C (2008). Large accounting finns also have compiled booklcts 
describing treatment differences. Eg.. ERNST & YOUl'<G, US GAAP V. IFRS: THE BASICS (2009), 
ami/able at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsIlFRS_v_ GAAP _basics_Jan09/£file/ 
IFRS _ v_ GAAP _ basics_Jan09.pdf; DELOITTE, IFRSs /\;-';0 US GAAP: A POCKET COMPARISON (2007), 
amilable (/t http://www.iasplus.com/dtlpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf; DELOITTE. IFRSS IN YOUR POCKET 
200R (2008). (lvailahf!! at http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pocket2008.pdf; 
PRICEWA1TRHOUSECOOPERS, SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL 
FI1\ANCli,L REPORTING STANDARDS AND US GAAP FOR I VESTMENT FUNDS (2007). 
46. William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Tl'eotmei71 Diflerences and Political 
Realities ill the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L REV. 989. 1022 (2009). 
47. EpSTEIN & JERMAKOWICZ. supra note 45. at 533-35. 
480  UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA T'V RE VIEW [Vol .  79 
consolidated basis.4� GAAP defines control with a by-the-numbers test. 
Consolidation fol lows from ownership of 50% plus one share of the 
subsidiary ' s  stock, but the inference of control can be rebutted where 
control actually is not held or is temporary .49 IFRS begins with a 50% 
p lus one share test as well ,  but modifies the zone of control under a 
standard that variously looks to other arrangements respecting voting 
shares, contractual arrangements, and regulatory contexts . Application 
of the standard can cut either way, turning less than 51 % ownership into 
control or rejecting a finding of control given more than 5 0%.50 The 
rules versus principles distinction is descriptive of the difference. But a 
caution about the description of GAAP is necessary-the fifty plus one 
presumption is rebuttable under both systems. 
IFRS affords reporting companies more elbow room in both of the 
above cases, but a dispassionate search for economic truth is not its only 
normative motivation. To get a more complete picture of the issues at 
stake , compare the treatments for tangible  long- lived assets.5 1  Under 
GAAP, they are can'ied on a cost basis. If the asset ' s  value is impaired, 
the impairment results in a charge to current income . Under IFRS, the 
asset may be carried at cost or fair value. If the asset ' s  value is 
impaired, the loss is dealt with by a balance sheet adjustment only. 
Moreover, if the asset ' s  value recovers ex post the impairment, the 
balance sheet adjustment can be reversed. Here we see that GAAP can 
be motivated by conservatism-the practice of dealing with uncertainty 
through asymmetric recognition of losses compared to gains . 52 It also 
favors verifiable numbers, thereby hewing more c losely to traditional 
cost accounting and constrain ing management ' s  "optionality" respecting 
balance sheet presentations. IFRS, being more comfortable about 
extending management discretion to revalue assets, inc ludes a broader 
range of fair value treatments, introducing subj ectivity into the 
determination of balance sheet amounts . Thus, under GAAP, when a 
tangible  asset is  written down, the write down is pennanent, whi le under 
IFRS, tangible asset values can change with exterior shifts in valuation 
as management detern1ines . 
Note also that in the case of a dec line in value, GAAP forces 
recognition on the income statement, while IFRS lets the company take 
48. Bratton & Cunningham. supra notc 46. at 1020. 
49. FI'4. ACCOUi\TING STAi'-iOAROS Bo .. STATEMENT OF F INANCIAL ACCOUNT Ij\;G STANDARDS 
Nu. 94: CUi\SOLIDATION UF ALL MAJORITy-OWNED SUBSIOIARII,S �§ 10. 13 (19S7j. 
50. EpSTEIN & JERMAKOWICZ. supra note 45. at 441-42. 
51. l:lratton & Cunningham, slIpra note 46, al 1015. 
52. See Sudipta Basu, The COlisen'utislII Pril1ciple (Illd the AsvlJlllletric Tilllelil7ess uf Etlmil1gs. 
24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1997). 
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care of the matter with a balance sheet adjustment. This difference also 
applies more generally .  GAAP is income statement oriented because it 
evolved as a system that is responsive to the demands of equity holders 
in U.S .  financial markets. 53 When GAAP requires an event to impact 
the income statement, it flags the event for actors valuing the company. 
IFRS,  with its ties to blockholder governance regimes, favors the 
balance sheet, reflecting the greater influence of other constituents, 
specifically bank creditors and emp loyees . 54 
Next, compare the treatments for research and development 
expenses. 55 Under GAAP, these are expensed in the period incurred and 
cash outflows are classified into the operating section of the cash flow 
statement. Under IFRS, research and development costs are capital ized; 
that is, the company books the costs as an asset and shows them on its 
cash flow statement as investment cash flows. A basic policy difference 
again is manifest. Under GAAP, conservatism is a motivating principle, 
and doubts tend to be resolved by forcing a present deduction on the 
income statement. In contrast, IFRS is more liberal and management­
friendly, assuming that research and development results in tangible 
economic value and delaying recognition of its costs for an extended 
future. 
GAAP conservatism can also be seen in revenue recognition. 56 When 
given a service contract to be perfonned over multiple repOliing periods, 
IFRS lets a company recognize a l l  the revenue up-front upon partial 
performance . GAAP, taking more seriously the idea that revenues 
should be matched to expenses, amortizes these contracts over the 
period of service without up-front recognition. Keep in mind that the 
IFRS approach bears a more than passing resemblance to the treatment 
tha t Enron Corporation received from FA S B '  s Emerging Issues Task 
Force, under which it was pernlitted to show all gains from its long-term 
energy contracts up-front. 57 A similar comparison obtains respecting 
53 . See injl"([ notes 8 1 -93 and accompany i ng text. 
54. See Cunningham. SEC's Glohal Accounting Vision, supra note I. at 48. There is a paral lel. 
dark side to t h is. [n the U .S. ,  accounting manipUlation genera l l y  i mpacts the i ncome statement, eamings 
per share being a key factor in the compensation of the corporate i nsiders responsible. In block-holder 
countries, manipulation tends to impact the balance sheet, payoffs to the insiders responsib le stemming 
from the allocation of corporate assets, lei. (ci t ing Si mon Johnson et aI., Tunneling, AM. ECO"'. REV" 
May 2000, at 22: John C. Coffee, Jr. ,  A Theon' o(Corporate SC{jm/als: WIn' the Us. and Europe Di/F!r, 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL 'y, Summer 2005, at 198); see also Vladim i r  !\tanasov et aI., Unbundling and 
Measuring Tunneling (Univ.  of Tex. Sch .  of Law. Working Paper No. 2007), amilable at 
h ttp://papers. ssm.com/soI3!papers .cfm?abs tracU d= I 03 0529. 
55. Bratton & Cunningham. Slip/"{[ note 46, at 1 0 1 7 . 
56. Jd at 1 012. 
57 . See Emerging I ssues Task Force. Fin.  Accounting Standards Bcl., ISSLlC 98- 1 0. Accollnting 
for Contracts Involved in Encrgy Trading and Risk Management Activities. 
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accounting for pension obligations . 58 Under GAAP, unfunded pension 
benefit obligations must be shown as liabi l ities on the balance sheet. 
IFRS requires no balance sheet disclosure. Once again conservatism 
motivates GAAP, while managers get the benefit of the doubt under 
IFRS. 
F inally, we tum to inventory accounting, 59 an area where GAAP is 
the more flexible regime. For cost accounting purposes, one must make 
an assumption about the order in which goods are sold. They are e ither 
treated as sold in the direct order of production or acquisition-first-in­
first-out (FIFO)-or as sold in reverse order of production or 
acquisit ion-Iast-in-first-out (LIFO) . Given rising prices, FIFO more 
c losely reflects economic reality on the balance sheet, l isting inventories 
close to current values, while LIFO better reflects prevail ing economics 
on the income statement with a figure for cost of goods sold reflecting 
current prices. GAAP permits companies to choose; IFRS,  with its 
regime of balance sheet primacy, requires FIFO. 
What difference does al l  of this make at the bottom line? Accounting 
experts tend to agree that, as an empirical matter, applying GAAP versus 
IFRS results in significant bottom line reporting differences . One recent 
study shows that the difference between GAAP and IFRS earnings 
ranges from minus 84% to p lus 14%, with an average of minus 14% for 
GAAP issuers, with a range of treatments contributing to the 
differences. 60 
The above comparison and the bottom line empirical results in the 
end confirm the SEC's  description-GAAP constrains, where IFRS is 
5g.  Bratton & Cunn ingham. slIpra note 46, at 1 02 3 .  
5 9 .  id. a t  10 1 4. 
60. R ISKMETRICS GROUP, T H E  EARN INGS GAP ACCORDING TO LARGEST A DR S :  I F RS VS.  U S  
G A A P  1 (2008), available o f  http://www.sec .gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-55.pdf. 
D isagreement among the experts on the nonnative pol icy i mpl ications of the data also is  
noted. Consi der in this regard l i terature reviews and policy analysis by two committees of the American 
Accounting Association, the preeminent academic accounting body in the U n i ted States. The two 
authors agree that the empirical evidence indicates that significant differences exist in rep0l1ed 
accounting results when applying GAAP and I F R S ,  including the bottom l i ne balance sheet and income 
statement aggregates. Yet, the two draw d i fferent conc l usions, one encouraging competition among 
mult iple standards and the other cautioning that moving the U . S. to I F R S  is premature. Compare 
KAR IM JAMAL ET A L . ,  A M .  ACCOUNTING A S S ' N ,  A P ERSPECTIVE ON THE S E C ' S  PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPAR E D  IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL F INANCIAL REPORTI NG 
STANDARDS (l F R S) W I THOUT R ECONCILIATION TO U.S. GAAP (2007), (fi nding differences in outcomes 
but no evidence of relative superiority and, therefore, concluding that competition among the standards 
is optimal pol icy stance), with P ATR I C K  E. HOPKINS ET AL. .  AM. ACCOUNTING A S S ' N .  RESPONSE TO T H E  
S E C  REL EASE: ACCEPTANCE FROM FOR EIGN PRIVATE I SSUERS O F  FINANCIAL STATEMEi'iTS PR EPAR E D  
I N  ACCORDANCE W I T H  I NTERNATIONAL F INANCIAL R E PORTING STANDAR DS WITHOUT 
RECONC IL IATION TO U . S .  GAAP (2008) (finding material differences in outcomes that are relevant to 
investment dec is ions and therefore concluding that i t  i s  premature for the U . S .  to adopt I FRS). 
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flexible. But some important amplifications and qual ifications need to 
be added. Accounting theory certainly plays a role here, but differences 
of institutional context also matter. 
GAAP constraints do not necessarily follow a refractory attachment 
to detailed drafting at the FASB . There are values at stake, in particular 
conservatism, verifiabi lity, and transparent disclosure of current period 
results. P art I l l ' s  discussion of the FASB ' s  institutional history explains 
why the F ASB pursued these values. 
F irst, some explanatory background respecting IFRS is necessary . 
IFRS is flexible only partly as a matter of normative preference . I ts 
looseness also fol lows from the nature of the enterprise. 6 1 A one-size­
fits-al l set of global standards of necessity emerges as a big tent 
accommodating a range of national practices . The globe-spanning 
flexibility of I FRS also reflects differences in corporate governance 
systems and financial market regulation. I F RS '  s predecessor systems all 
developed in small national marketplaces with tight communities of 
intermediaries and investor populat ions largely made up of institutions . 
Tight communities can coexist with "light touch" regulation, 62 and as 
between GAAP and IFRS, the latter is the "l ight touch" choice . 
The differences in surrounding regimes of governance and regulation 
are wrought into the accounting systems. As an example , consider the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) requirement that, if necessary for the 
presentation of a true and fair v iew of the business, a particular 
mandated treatment must be overridden. 63 IFRS 's stated preference for 
treatments that follow from the economics of the transaction partakes of 
the same sp irit. Overrides have not been the practice in the U.S . ,  even as 
financials must "fairly present" the company's  financial position . 
Litigation risk is the reason for this,64 not GAAP. Lit igation risk is a 
property of the U. S .  adversary regulatOlY system, a system that, unl ike 
that of the U .K. ,  evolved to cope with a d ispersed, continent-wide anay 
of financial institutions and investor clients . 
It should also be noted that most of the countries in the IFRS fold 
have blockholder governance systems, although the U.K. ,  Austral ia, and 
Israel are exceptions to this general rule. B lockholders, having control 
or influence over internal decision-making, suffer diminished problems 
6 1 .  See James D.  Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: SlII"I'il'Ol Strategies ji)r a 75- Yew'-Old 
SEC, 95 VA L. REV. 94 1 , 947 (2009). 
62. Donald C.  Langevoort, u.s. Securities Regulatiol7 and Clobal Competition 1 3  ( Georgetown 
Law Facu lty Working Papers, Paper No.  89, 2008), (lvailable a/ http ://scholarship . law.gcorgetown.cd u! 
fwps _papcrs/89/. 
63 .  See Cunn ingham, SEC 's Clobal Accollnting Vision, supra note I ,  at -1 1 -42 . 
64. lei at 42. 
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of agency and information asymmetry. 6 5  Any question arising under a 
discretionary treatment can be answered by direct inquiry. Accounting 
principles accordingly matter less than they do, given the separation of 
ownership and control that prevails in the U. S .  
IFRS, then, fol lows from institutional and political inputs. GAAP 
does as wel l .  Part I I I  offers a more particular description of the 
environment in which GAAP evolved, further sharpening the distinction 
between the two systems. 
I I I .  GAAP ' s  POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The F ASB was established in the mid- 1 970s as the result of an ad hoc 
process looking toward the estab lishment of a v iable standard-setter 
under private auspices. The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants CAlCPA) took the lead, 66 with input from organizations and 
individuals representing management and the financial sector. 67 The 
organizers had a high-powered incentive : they wanted a responsive 
standard-setter without ceding territory to a federal agency,68 which in 
those days was assoc iated with domination by progressive, anti­
corporate types. 69 
Public legitimacy mattered, so the new standard-setter had to be 
independent, public minded, and insulated from political pressure, 70 yet 
simultaneously responsive to constituent interests. 7 1 The result was a 
board se lected by an independent foundation, which is also populated 
with constituents, along with a monitoring advisory body, also populated 
with constituents. 72 As already noted, today's IASB is a carbon copy 
65.  W i l l iam W. B ratton & Joseph A.  rVIcCahery, COlllpararil'e Corporate GOl'ernance and Ihe 
Theory o/Ihe Firm: The Case Against G/oha/ Cmss Reference, 38 COLUM . .I. TRANSNAT ' L  L. 2 1 3 . 226 
( 1 99 9 )  
66. Ronald King & Gregory Waymire. Accollnting Standard-Setting II/stitutiolls and Ihe 
GOI'enw/lce a/II/colllplete Coll/ruels, 9 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN.  579, 583-86 ( 1994). 
67. ROBERT VAN R I PER. SETTING STANDARDS FOR F INANCI AL REPORTING: FASB A N D  THt: 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF A CR ITICAL PROCESS 8-9 ( 1994); Mohamed Elmuttassim Hussein & J. 
Edward Kclz. Accounling Stllndardh<;elting in the u. s. : An Alllt/rsis o/Power and Social En'/wllge, 1 0  
J .  ACCT . & PUR.  PO L'y 59, 7 6  ( 1 99 1). 
68. The federa l securi t ies laws d i rected the SEC to prescribe the form and content of tInanc ial  
statements. Sec gerwroll) >  Securi t ies Act of 1933. Pub.  L .  No. 73 -22, 4X Stat .  74 ( 1934).  For a review of 
the legislative history. see Sean M. O' Connor, Be Carefit! What YOII Wish For: flolI' AccolinlOills (lnd 
Congress Created Ihe Problelll oj' A lidilOr Independence, 45 B.C. L. R E V .  74 1 .  789-820 (2004 ) .  The 
SEC then tllmed the matter over to the A I CPA. VAN RIPER,  supra note 67, at 7. 
69.  See V AN RIPER,  slipra note 67.  at  9 .  
70. !d 
7 1 .  See RO BERT CHATOV, CORPORATE FINA:--.JC IAL REPO RTING: PUBl.lC OR P RIVATE CONTROL')  
232-39 ( 1 975) .  
72 .  VAN R I PER, slIpra note 67, at 1 3- 1 8. 
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except with a larger cast of characters and geographic distribution . 73 reqUIrements. 
A. Objections on the Right and the Left 
The FASB 's  governance model, now repl icated at the IASB, pursues 
a middle ground that has aroused political objections from the right and 
the left .  From the right, public choice commentators denounced the 
arrangements surrounding the F ASB as a rent-seeking scam. From this 
point of view, the F ASB should have operated as a private standard­
setter subject to free competition . It ,  instead, has worked as a cog in the 
larger machine of the federal disclosure system, the mandates of which 
yield rents to aUditing firms. 74 Following the Roadmap to substitute the 
IASB only makes matters worse, taking an unsatisfactory domestic 
arrangement and embedding it on a global basis. A prediction fol lows : 
The big auditing firms should count among the Roadmap ' s  strong 
supporters . 
A second set of critics attacked from the progressive, pluralist left .  
For them, choices of accounting principles have significant allocative 
consequences; therefore, accounting standard setting is a high stakes 
game in which the setter has no alternative but to balance interests .75 
Because the setter resolves political rather than technical issues, its 
legitimacy depends on political responsiveness.  76 At its inception, the 
FASB could not provide this because it depended on contributions from 
the preparers and auditors, groups with high stakes in al l  of its 
outcomes . 77 The critics contended that the standard-setter should be an 
agency directly responsible to Congress . 78 Substituting the IASB only 
makes things worse from th is point of view because it removes political 
subject matter to a distant venue in which U .S .  domestic concerns 
occupy, at best, a secondary place on the agenda 79 and scraps a publ icly­
funded standardsetter for one beholden to private interests . 
73 .  See 2007 Con cept Release, supra note 3, at 45,605; Ruder et ai., supra note 16, at 519-20; 
.\'1'E' also I NT ' L  ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L ACCOUNTING STA NDA RDS COMM. FOUND. ,  WHO 
WE ARE AND WHAT W E  Do, supra note 25. 
74. See Ross L.  Watts & Jerold A. Zimmerman, The Demand /i)r und Supply of Accounting 
Theories: The Market./hr Excuses, 54 ACCT. REV. 273, 275-81 ( 1 979). 
75. See VAN RIPER,  slIpra note 67. at 73 -74. 
76. See id at 22-23 . 
77 . See id at 1 4; STA FF OF SUBCOMM. 01'\ REPS., ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT, S. COMM. ON 
Gov 'r OrE RATIO:\S, 94TH CONG., T H E  ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT: A STAFF STUDY 1-2 (Comm. 
Print 1976). 
78 . See VAN RIP ER, .wpm note 67 at 45. 
79. The 2008 Roadmap, SlIpro note 7, at 70,8 27, recognizes that substitution of I F R S  for GA AP 
im plies diminished influence for U . S .  interests. 
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The public choice critique has never had much political traction . In 
contrast, the progressive attack had an impact in the F ASB'  s early years 
and prompted process reforms that strengthened the F ASB '  s pub lic bona 
fides, particularly in a trend toward ever-increasing distance from the 
AICPA. 80 This critique also has lost salience in recent years, but largely 
because the F ASB, over time, managed to reshape itself to meet the 
critic isms. 
The SEC Roadmap recognizes that accountabil ity concerns retain 
validity with regard to the IASB . As we have seen, the SEC wants the 
IASCF to get a new monitoring board, and the IASCF has invented one. 
But one wonders how well the new oversight setup will serve to meet 
the public accountability objection. It imports public accountabil ity, but 
to a diverse internationally distributed oversight panel possessing 
advisOlY input without veto authority . Funding may be a b igger 
problem sti l l .  As we also have seen, the F ASB has secure funding, 
thanks to SOX, while the IASB still relies on contributors-32% of its 
2009 budget came from the Big Four aUditing finns. 
Thus, to the extent public accountability matters, a switch to IFRS 
represents a step backward. The move is doubly disconcerting in v iew 
of the FASB's  history. Credible and independent private standard­
setters do not just pop out of technocratic jack-in-the-boxes. The FASB 
spent the better part of thirty years pursing full dress public legitimacy­
it formulated, reformulated, tweaked, and re-tweaked itself, and finally, 
with SOX it was able to get its ducks in a row. The Roadmap would 
throw away history'S  lessons in favor of an institution at an earlier, 
ambiguous stage of evolution. If there were no alterative path to cost 
savings from convergence, this might loom large as an objection. But, 
as we have seen, a path exists. 
B. The FASB and the lvlanagement interest 
The pol itical plot thickens with regard to the histOlY the FASB ' s  
relations with its most cons istent, most vocal adversaries-corporate 
managers . 
Management, although a major player at the table at the F ASB ' s  
inception, quickly became an adversary . The F A S B  crossed 
management when it undertook its initial project to articulate generally 
accepted goals of accounting. The project, which came to be called the 
Conceptual Framework, is a set of principles much derided for its high 
so. See VAN R I PER, supra note 67, at 14- 1 5, 46-47, 86-87, 1 26 .  
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level of generality.  8 1  But the Conceptual Framework did provide at 
least one outcome determinative point, 82 which lies in a single 
unprepossessing sentence in S tatement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 1 :  "Financial reporting should provide information that is 
useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in 
making rational investment, credit, and similar dec isions ."s3 This is 
called dec ision usefulness ,  and it seems to state the obvious, but in the 
1 970s this was a radical proposition . 84 
F inancial repoliing serves two purposes: it imports external 
transparency and it serves as part of a rational system of internal 
management. 85 Three decades ago, the prevailing concept of purpose, 
called "stewardship," encompassed both. 86 It meant that corporate 
managers had a p lace at the table with market actors as important users 
of the standards . Indeed, they c laimed primacy. 87 
When the F ASB e levated the status of outside users of financials with 
decision usefulness, 88 it broke with history and defected against 
management. It thereby succeeded in protecting its own independence, 
avoiding the p luralist alternative of regulation as mediation in a world of 
multiple constituents with varied and conflicting preferences. 89 
Decision usefulness also imported policy legitimacy, implying a one­
size-fits-all theoretical j ustification for the enterprise as a whole. Back 
in the 1 970s, management was peddling national competitiveness and 
public welfare to argue for a cost-benefit burden of proof to be met by 
every new accounting standard, 90 an argument that eventually would 
register in Congress with respect to SEC rulemaking9 1 and stil I registers 
8 ! .  See Stephen A. Zen� A Persl)('ctive all the U s. Puhlic/Privute-Sector Approach ro rhe 
Reguia/iull or Financia/ Reporting, ACCT. HORIZONS. Mm. 1 995,  at 52,  60; VAN RIPER, supra note 67. 
at SO. 
82.  See John C. BUl1on, A COJ/1l11en/my on the Reflectiolls 0/ Homer Kripke, 4 J. ACCT. 
AUDITING & F IN. 79, 80 ( 1 989) .  
83.  See FIN .  ACCOUNTING STA "[JAROS B D . ,  Statement of Fin.  Accounting Concepts No . 1 :  
Object ives o f  Fin ancial Repol1ing by Business Enterprises § 34 ( 1 9 78). {lvai/uhle ar 
http://www.fasb .org/pdtkon I .pdf (hereafter F ASB,  SF AC No. I ] . 
84. See V AN RI PER, supra note 67. at 20.  
85.  See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 74,  at 296-97. 
86.  !d. at 296. 
fi7 .  See V AN RIPER. supra note 67, at 2 1 .  
88.  See FASB, SFAC No. 1 ,  supra note 8: 1 ,  § �  27, 32 .  
89 .  See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitab/e and Ef/iciellf Accoullfing Policy, 63 ACCT. 
REV. l, 2, 13 ( 1988 ) . 
90.  See R. K. MA UTZ & WILLIAM G. MAY, FINANCIAL D ISCLOSURE IN A COMPETITIVE 
ECONO M Y :  COI" S ID ERATIONS IN ESTABLISH ING F INANC IAL ACCOUNT ING STAN DARDS 1 -4 ( 1 978) 
( presenting a project of the Fin:lI1cial Execut ives Research Foundation). 
9 1 .  See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1 996, § 1 06(a) ( 2), 1 5 U.s .c. § 77b(b) 
(2006).  
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in  today' s  convergence discussions. The Conceptual Framework ' s  focus 
on markets let the F ASB argue first, that information is a publ ic  good 
that wil l  be underprovided absent regulation, 92 and second, that 
standards directed to user uti l i ty reduce the social costs of infonnation 
asymmetry, which include high transaction costs and thin capital 
markets with low l iquidity. 93 
Decision usefulness also aligned the FASB 's  goals with that of its 
governmental overseer, the SEC, and the SEC's  goal of investor 
protection. 94 The two agencies maintained a cooperative relationship 
that has worked wel l .  The SEC ' s  recent defection against the FASB 
also amounts to a defection from decision usefulness .  A shift to IFRS, 
with its constituency-responsive stress on balance sheet treatments and 
de-emphasis of income statement respons iveness, would amount to a 
retreat in the direction of stewardship . 
Meanwhile, management has never been entirely happy with GAAP. 
As the F ASB has independently set its own agenda, management has 
seen a classic case of an unresponsive regulatory agency promulgating 
regulations for their own sake. 95 Management also comp lains of excess 
complexity, but not when it l ikes the bottom line result. 96 Management 
voices use the F ASB 's notice and comment and advisory processes to 
object, but only get occasional concessions as the FASB keeps cranking 
out standards it would just as soon do without. 97 
The managers call the result  "standards overload. ,,98 Back in the 
1 980s, their representatives recommended an organizational overhaul to 
address the problem. This would have shifted agenda control at the 
FASB to a new oversight board with power to block agenda i tems and 
force revision of existing standards. 99 Such drastic reform proposals 
have never gone anywhere, even as management has scored occasional 
victories in its long battle with the FAS B. It has used its political 
muscle to block proposed standards. It also secured two scats on the 
FASB, and for a whi le ,  had a super majority voting regime that made it 
92. See FIN. ACCOUNTl NG STANDARDS B o . ,  STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 2 :  
QUALITATIVE C H A RACTERISTlCS O F  ACCOUNTING I N FORMATION § 1 3 5 ( 1 980),  ava i/aMe (/f 
http://w\Vw. fasb.org/pdf/con2 .pdf [hereinafter FAS B . SFAC No. 2]: Lev. supra note 89. at 8-9. 
93. Lev, sUfJ}'{/ note 89, at 4-9. 
94. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 1 4 1 .  
9 5 .  See Denn is  R .  Beresford, Hol-\' Should the FASB B e  Judged:), ACCT. HORIZONS, June 1 9 95,  
at 56, 5 7. 
96. /d at 60; VAN RIPER,  supra note 67, at 1 1 0. 
97. Beresford, supra note 95. at 59; VAN R I PER, supra note 67, at 98-99, 1 1 8-3 1 ,  1 83 .  
9 8 .  VAN RIPER, supra note 6 7 ,  a t  1 3 7:  Beresford, supra note 95 .  a t  60. 
99. Beresford, supra note 95, at 57: VAN RIPER, supra note 67. at 1 1 9-2 3 .  
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harder for the FASS to adopt new standards. 1 00 
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Meanwhi le, management 's  complaint of excess complexity col lapses 
into the more serious complaint that the F ASS drafts too many rules, 
seeking to supply a c lear answer to every possible situation, p ursuing the 
objective with detai led statements, bright-line tests , and multiple 
exceptions .  1 0 1  This complaint returns us  to  the Roadmap ' s  j ustification 
for doing away with the F ASB altogether and so bears importantly on 
the present discussion. 
There is no question that GAAP's  layers of rules can have perverse 
effects. Internal incons istency can result. 1 02 Comparabil ity also can 
suffer as reporting entities under the same strict  standard can appear 
comparable on the faces of their financials when their arrangements in 
fact are dissimi lar. 1 03 Worse is the resulting dysfunctional, check-the­
box approach to compliance that admits transaction structuring and other 
strategic behavior, along with rule compliant statements that do not 
fairly state the reporting company' s  results or financial position. 1 04 
Actors at the F ASS reply that the rules follow from demands 
generated by managers and auditors looking for treatment exceptions, 
scope exceptions, and "roadmaps" that hold out "guidance. , , 1 05 It 
apologizes, but it is just being a responsive regulator and does not 
exerc ise total control over outcomes. 1 06 However, this posture of 
accommodation also has a dark side, for it is here that the public choice 
critique registers with full force. The securities laws' requirement of an 
independent audit makes the large audit firms providers of a necessary 
service, positioning them to collect  rents . 1 07 The critics allege that 
complex, rules-based standards aid and abet the rent seeking, generating 
work 1 08 and over time strengthening entry batTiers . 1 09 Moreover, 
1 00. VAN R IPER , supra note 67, at 1 26, 1 50, 1 54. 
1 0 1 .  See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT & OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS,  U . S .  SEC. & EXCH. 
COM M ' N ,  STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1 08(D) OF THE SARBAN ES-OXlEY ACT OF 2002 ON TI lE  
ADOPTION BY THE U NITED STATES FINANC!Al REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRI  CI PlES-BASED 
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM � I . C  (2003 ). 
1 02 .  Jd. � L G .  
1 03 .  !d 
1 04 .  Id. ; Katherine Sc hipper, PrinCiples-Based Accollnting Stalldarell-, ACCT. HORIZO, 'S,  Mar. 
2003, at 6 1 , 68.  
1 0 5 .  See VAN R I PER, slIpra note 67, at 1 05 .  
1 06.  See Lawrence W. Smilh, The FASB ',\' £.(Iorls To\\ 'eml Simplilication, FASB R E P . ,  Feb. 2 8 ,  
2005,  at 2 ,  3-4. 
1 07.  See George J .  BenIson, The Regulatioll oI flccOlinfanls and PIiMic Accuunting Beli)re alld 
Ajier Enroll, 52 EMORY L.J .  1 3 25, 1 329-3 I (2003 ). 
1 08 .  See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A S)'llthesis, 1 9  J. ACCT, RES.  227,  23 1 ( 1 98 I ) . 
1 09 .  See Dale Buckmaster cl aI . ,  /v/eosurillg Lobbying Inlluence Using lhe Fil10ncial A ccounting 
Slal7darc!.1 Board Puhlic Record. 20 J. ECO N .  & Soc. M EASUREMENT 33 1 ,  340 ( 1 994). 
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innovations get choked off to the extent that they decrease auditabi lity 
and expose the audit firms to legal risk. J J O 
All  of this is tme, but, given the pressures that have come to bear on 
the F ASB, it is difficult to imagine a different evolutionary course for 
GAAP. In  effect, the FASB has had to take our second-best world as it 
finds it .  I t  is a nasty p lace where incentive problems impair the auditor­
c lient relati onship, auditability matters , and the standard-setter has to 
worry about scandal prevention. 1 1 1 Rules, although not ideal, have 
advantages because they provide a base of common assumptions and 
knowledge for preparers, auditors, and users . They decrease differences 
in measurement; they make noncompl iance more evident. And, as room 
for differences in judgment narrows, transparency and comparabi l ity are 
enhanced. 1 1 2 GAAP has fol lowed from defensible trade-offs . 
In  summary, the F ASB put itself on history 's  winning side with 
decision usefulness, overcoming management resistance along the 
way.  J 1 3 I t  thereby aligned itself not only with the SEC but also with the 
broader economic shift away from "managerialism" toward capital 
market governance under the shareholder value nonn. 1 1 4 The story of 
GAAP's  evolution is thus a story about standard setting in the U .S .  
markets, where separated ownership and control predominates while 
tensions between managers and shareholders are exhaustively worked 
out in regulation and l itigation. The FASB opted for conservatism, 
verifiability ,  and mles because it operates in this environment, not 
because of a theoretical commitment to a dysfunctional approach to 
standard setting. The IASB, with its shorter history and different 
regulatory context, has pursued different values .  Accordingly, it is not 
enough to describe the IASB as "independent" and its standards as "high 
quality" to end the convergence discussion in its favor. 
1 1 0 . Set! George Mundstock, The Troll"'e mlh F4SB. 2X N . C. J . INT ' L  L.  & COM. R ECi .  8 1 3 , 8 1 7  
(2003 ). 
I l l . St!1! W i l liam W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, alld 1/71' Acc()ull ling Crisis ill Ihe UllilCd Slules, 5 
EUR.  B u s .  ORG .  L. REV.  7, 1 4-1 8 (2 004) ( describing advantages o f  rules in the auditing co ntc,\t). 
1 1 2 .  Sf'e Schipper, supra note 1 04, at 6 8 .  
1 1 3 .  For fl1 l1her discussion. see Wil l iam W .  Bratton. Pril'ule Slallclun/,', Pllhlic GIJI'emancc: A 
!VI!II' Look ul lhl' Financial ;/ccolll1ling Siandard�' Board, 48 B . C .  L. REV. 5 (2007) .  
1 1 4. Interestingly, a recent report on accounting from an SEC advi sory commi ttee recommends 
additional user representation on the F A F .  See /\ DVISORY COM",! . ON IMPROV E M ENTS TO F IN.  
REPORTING, U . S .  SEC . & EXCH.  COlvlM 'N,  F INAL REPORT OF T H E  ADVISORY COMM ITTEE O:\' 
IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING TO THE U;-";ITED STATES SECUR I TlES AND EXCl-IA, GE 
COMMISS ION 4 (2008), (Ivailable at http ://www.sec .gov/about/offices/oca/ac i ti-Jacifr-finalreporr.pdf 
[hereafter ACIFR REPORT] . The recommendation is understan dable, but hardly pressing in l ight of the 
F ASB ' s  commitment to decision usefulness. 
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IV .  POLITICS GOING FORWARD 
The politics of accounting had a stable equilibrium in the U .S .  for 
three decades. On one side stood the SEC, the F ASB,  market 
intermediaries, I I  5 and the users, jointly backing decision usefulness. 
These interests dominated. Management stood on the other side, 
pushing back as it looked for a larger zone of reporting discretion. The 
big audit fimls stood between them, looking for standards that enhanced 
their rents and diminished the threat of litigation. The standards 
themselves reflected the interests thus aligned. 
The Roadmap disrupts this equilibrium. GAAP has come to be seen 
as one of the deadweight domestic regulatory costs that make U .S .  
capital markets unattractive to foreign issuers . Thus has the SEC, 
looking to l ighten its touch,  abandoned a standard-setter that it had long 
protected, citing the capital market interests in so doing. But the SEC, at 
the same time, severs connections to the capital market interests that 
aligned to favor decision usefulness. The SEC's  comparabi lity 
justification looks only to a subset of capital market users-those 
investing in the global context--without asking whether U .S .  users as a 
whole will benefit from the shift. 
A question arises respecting the various interest groups '  reactions to 
the Roadmap . These can be accessed through the comment letters in the 
SEC file.  The letters underscore the foregoing analysis. The audit finns 
are in favor, and the capital market users are against. Interestingly, the 
managers are sp lit . 
A.  Audit Firms 
The Big Four audit finns voice the strongest support. 1 1 6 They want a 
1 1 5 .  See VA" R I PER, slIpra note 67,  at 98 .  
1 1 6 .  See Letter from PriceWaterhollseCoopers LLP to  El izabeth M .  Murphy, Sec'y. U.S .  Sec .  & 
Exch.  Comm 'n ( Apr. 20, 2009), available at httpJ/www. sec. gov/comments/s 7-2 7-08/s72 708-2 I S .pdf; 
Letter from KPMG LLP to Florence E. Hannon, Acting Sec'y ,  U . S .  Sec. & Exch. Comm'n ( Apr. 1 6 , 
2009), availollle at h ltp ://www.sec.gov/commentsis7-27-08/s72 708- 1 1 4.pdf; Letter from Deloi tte & 
Touche LLP to El izabeth Murphy, Sec ' y ,  U . S .  Sec.  & Exch. Comm 'n (Apr. 3, 2009),  (lmi/able at 
http ://www . sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-87.pdf; Letter from Ernst & Young L L P  to E l izabeth 
Murphy, Sec'y, U . S .  Sec. & Exch.  Comm ' n  ( March 4, 2009), availahle at http ://www. sec.gov! 
comments/s7-27-08/s72708-5 9.pdf; see also ADVISORY COM M .  ON THE A UDITING PROFESSION, U . S .  
D E P ' T  O F  T H E  TREASURY, FINAL REPORT (2008) at  C.3-CA ( remarks o f  U S. Treasury Sec retary Henry 
Paulson connecting global ization and international financial  reporting standards Vv'ith legal burdens 
auditors face) & VI I.23-V I 1 . 3 2  (reviewing disagreement among Committee members on wide range of 
l it igation defenses and legal protections that auditing firms sought in comprehensi ve review of i ssues 
fac ing the profession. including effects of global ization and movcment towards international fi nanc ial 
rep0l1ing standards) ,  available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ offices/domestic-finance/ac ap/docs/final­
report.pdf. 
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date certain for the switch, and perhaps more importantly, a redirection 
of  the F ASB ' s efforts pending the date certain .  Resources, they say, 
should go into moving along key topics in the convergence process and 
new standard setting should cease. 1 1 7 The switch, moreover, should be 
all-encompassing. IFRS should be accepted as authoritative as it is 
promulgated by the IASB and carve outs that differentiate national 
systems should be avoided. 1 18  There is also some push back, but this 
goes to litigation concerns . IFRS means greater reliance on principles 
and some "may use hindsight and preferences to unnecessari ly chal lenge 
and overturn reasonable professional judgments of preparers and 
auditors .
, , 1 1 9 The auditors fol low up with the classic move of putting the 
burden on the regulator: the SEC, they say, should make a policy 
statement describing the factors it brings to bear in arti culating the 
reasonableness of a judgment. 1 20 
Interestingly, the B ig Four appear ready to go ahead with IFRS 
whether they get the policy statement from the S EC .  By implication, 
forced to choose between GAAP and IFRS without a change in the 
l itigation environment, they will take their chances with I FRS.  Why 
should this be? Three reasons can be suggested. First, Roadmap 
implementation means switching costs at every U .S .  issuer, costs that 
translate into rents for auditors . Second, as between a financially 
independent standard-setter and a standard-setter beholden to the audit 
firms for funding, the audit firms prefer the latter. Third, the F ASB 's  
rules have had their intended effect. They make violations easier to 
observe and verify, which heightens the litigation risk. Principles open 
up a zone in which treatments fol low from business judgments , making 
violations harder and more expensive to prove . An important point 
follows : rules are thought to be the tools of corporate insiders who know 
how to game them. That is true in some contexts, but principles can 
l ikewise be gamed. The auditors ' enthusiasm for IFRS should make 
people suspicious. 
B. Users 
To see such suspicions in the Roadmap comment file, one only needs 
to look at users ' letters, which register strong, policy-based res istance. 
I 1 7 . Letter from PriceWaterhouseCoopcrs L L P  t o  E l izabeth M .  Murphy, supra note I 1 6 . at R.  
1 1 8 . Letter from Ernst & Young LLP to Elizabeth Murphy, Slipro note 1 1 6 , at 7.  
I J 9.  Letter from Deloi tte & Touche LLP to E l izabeth Murphy. slipm note 1 1 6 , at 5 .  
1 2 0. Id. ; Letter from KPMG LLP t o  Fl orence E .  Harmon, supra note 1 1 6 . at I I .  H ere t h e  S EC set 
itse lf  up. The auditors ci te the ACIFR REPORT, supra note 1 1 4, which made this suggestion. 
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The Council  of Institutional Investors lays this out. 1 2 1 The Council ,  
before it wi l l  endorse IFRS, wants to see, inter alia: ( 1 )  the same quali ty 
information coming from IFRS as from GAAP; (2) equally good 
application by issuers and enforcement by regulators; (3) sufficient 
resources at the IASB and full-time commitments from its members; (4) 
a clear cut commitment to decision usefulness at the IASB; and (5) a 
governance structure at the IASB that guarantees insulation from 
interference by governmental actors. l 22 Looking at the Roadmap, the 
Council finds none of these guarantees forthcoming. 1 23 The financial 
analysts concur. They want a roadmap with mi lestones shaped by 
investor concerns and think the F ASB-IASB convergence project 
suffices for th is purpose. 1 24 The Standard & Poors letter provides 
another example of the users ' concerns. As a large credit rating agency; 
Standard & Poors spends as much time reviewing financial statements as 
any organ ization in the world. It  agrees with the other user critics, 
noting that principles-based standards are fine in theory, but make sense 
for a heavy user only if the system incorporates additional disclosure 
requirements that enable the user to look through to the particular 
application dec ision. 1 25 Nothing in I FRS or in the Roadmap assures this 
inforn1ation. 
C Preparers 
The Roadmap poses a cost-benefit tradeoff for the preparers and their 
managers. The cost is the near-term out-of-pocket cost of making the 
switch. The benefit is the longer-term advantage of shifting to a more 
flexible standard-setter. It should be noted that the benefit does not lie 
in an expectation that U .S .  management can dominate the IASB where it 
1 2 1 .  See also Letter from Christianna Wood & Louis F .  Moret, Co-Chairs, Accounting & 
Auditing Practi ces Comm.,  In! " l  Corporate Governance Network, to El izabeth M .  M u rphy, See'y, U . S .  
Sec.  & Exch. Comm'n ( Apr, 2 0 ,  2009 ),  availahle al  hup://www .sec. gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72 708 -
2 2 1 .pdf; Letter from Mary Hartman M orri s,  Investment Officer, Cal . Pub. Employces' Ret. Sys. ,  to  
El izabeth M.  M u rphy, Sec'y, U.S.  Sec . & Exch.  Comm'n ( Apr. 20, 2009), ami/ahle al 
http://www .sec .govicoJl1mcntsis7-27-08/s72708-226.pdf: Letter from Jack T. Ciesielsk i ,  I nvestors 
Technical Advisory Comm., Fin .  Accounting Standards Bd. ,  to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U . S .  
Sec. & E x c h .  COllllll 'n ( J an. 30, 20(9). available 0 1  http ://www.sec .gov/comments/s7-2 7-08/s72708-
3 2.pdf. 
1 22 .  Letter  from Jeff Mahoney, General Counsel, Counc il  of Institutional I nvestors, to Florence E. 
!-lannon, Act ing Sec'y,  U . S . Sec. & Exch.  Comm'n 2 ( Apr. 20, 2009), availahle al 
h ttp://w\Vw . s e c .gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72 708- 1 94.pdf. 
1 2 3 .  Jd at 1 -2 .  
1 24.  See Lettcr fro m  Kurt N .  Schacht & Gerald I .  White t o  Florence Harmon, supra note 44, a t  3 .  
1 2 5 .  Exactly s o .  See Letter from Neri Bukspan et a I . ,  Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs. ,  t o  
Florence E.  Harmon, Act ing Sec 'y,  U . S .  Sec. & Exch. Comm 'n 3 ( Apr. 2 0 ,  2009), availahle a l  
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-1  72 .  pdf. 
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has fai led to dominate the FAS B .  The IASB also has a reputation for 
independence. 1 26 Moreover, g iven its broader, global roster of 
constituents, any particular demands emanating from a single national 
interest group or regulator are bound to resound less forcefully than they 
would in a domestic standard setting context. The advantage for 
management lies in the "elbow room" imported by a shift to a shorter, 
less directive stack of standards. A shift to IFRS ameliorates the 
problem of "standards overload" in one swoop. Indeed, given one 
global standard-setter and national governments and interest groups 
worldwide, it might prove quite difficult for the IASB to establish new 
standards, amel iorating the "overload" going forward. 
The corporate issuers ' comment letters can be sorted in  accordance 
with the ir reactions to the cost-benefit question. Most resist the 
Roadmap on out-of-pocket cost grounds, asking why they should be 
asked to spend mil l ions on switching in a time of economic stress and 
noting that the F ASB-IASB coordination process holds out a less costly 
route to convergence. l 27 Others, particularly large multinationals with 
subsidiaries that report under IFRS, are more welcoming 1 28 but would 
like additional time to accomplish the switch. Sti l l ,  others worry about 
particular treatments, with the IFRS restriction to F IFO inventory 
accounting being a paIiicular contentious issue in certain industries. 1 29 
Significantly, many mention the impOliance of assuring an "appropriate" 
level of U .S .  i nput into IFRS. 1 30 Apparently, the IASCF ' s  requirement 
1 2 6. I t  famously held its ground against the French banks and their government on fair value 
treatment on macro-hedging. See Ruder et aI., supra note 1 6, at 5 79-86. More recently, however, 
I A S B ' s  reputation became tarnished when i t  relented to Eu ropean Un ion pressure to match U . S .  
adjustments respecting market t o  market accounting of distressed debt securities in  bank portfol ios .  See, 
e.g., Phi l l ip  I n man, UK Accollnting Watchdog Threatells ro Quit Over EU Rille Challge, GUARD IAN 
( London ), Nov. 1 2 , 2008, at 26 (describing the resultant threat to resign of S i r  David Tweedie, l A S B ' s  
chaimlan ) .  
1 2 7 .  F o r  a bristl in g  enumeration of unaddressed cost concerns, s e e  Letter from Richard H .  
Murray, Chairman, Ctr. for Capital M kts. Competitiveness, U . S .  Chamber o f  Commerce, t o  E l izabeth 
Murphy, Sec'y, U . S .  Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 20, 2009), aWlilable at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-27-08/s72708 - 1 84.pdf. 
1 2 8.  See, e.g. , Letter from Robert Traficanti, Vice President & Deputy Controller, Citigroup Inc . ,  
to  El izabeth M urphy, Sec'y,  U.S .  Sec.  & Exch. Comm'n 1 ( A pr. 20,  2009),  available at  
http ://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708- 1 5 7.pdf. 
1 29. For a summary of corporate responses, see Letter from Paul J .  Cienki,  Chairman, Corporate 
Roundtable on I n t ' I  Fin. Reporting, & Matthew M .  M i l l er, Executive Dir . ,  Corporate Roundtab le on 
I n t ' l  Fin. Reporting, to El izabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y,  U . S .  Sec. & Exch. Comm'n ( Apr. 20, 2009), 
available at hnp://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-2 7-08/s72708-202 .pdf. The writers represent an ad hoc 
group of seventy-five senior financial executives from thirty U . S .  companies, organized to c hannel 
reactions to I FR S .  
1 3 0. See, e.g. , Letter from Jamie S.  M i l ler, V i c e  President & Control ler,  G e n .  E lec.  C o . ,  to 
E l izabeth Murphy, Sec 'y, U . S .  Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3 ( Apr. 2 1 ,  2009),  available at 
http ://www .sec.gov /comments/s 7 -2 7 -08/s 72 708-232. pdf. 
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that four of the s ixteen IASB seats be taken by North Americans 1 3 1  is 
not seen to assure an "appropriate" level of influence by U .S .  
management. 
D. u.s. Interests in an IFRS World 
If the Roadmap in the end takes us to IFRS, what will the new 
political equi l ibrium look like? The comment letters imply that the old 
conflicts wi l l  again be acted out in the new global context. 
To see why, compare the position taken by the auditing firms with 
that of the managers . The auditing firms stress that mandated IFRS will 
work only if U . S .  interests, including the SEC, take a deferential posture 
to the IASB . Under thi s  view, opting in means accepting the IASB and 
its governance structure as authoritative, even if  U .S .  interests find the 
standards produced inappropriate. When the comment letters from 
management express doubts about the magnitude of U .S .  input at the 
IASB ,  they, in effect, express doubts about the viab i l i ty of IASB 
authoritativeness. Even if IFRS ,  in its present form, is more congenial 
to management as a general proposition, there is no guarantee of future 
suitabi l ity. For al l  anyone knows, the IASB could in the long nm 
compound the problem management has had with the F ASB-an 
independent IASB could start establishing standards the managers 
disl ike without any U .S .  actor being in a position to stop it .  Now tum to 
the users, who express concerns about authoritativeness from another 
point of view. They worry that the IASB, as it goes forward in i ts 
amorphous global governance position, will  prove subject to the 
influence of foreign governments and interest groups who lack a 
commitment to decision usefulness. 
Thus the Roadmap raises a political question concerning the 
framework of relations between the SEC and the IASB .  The U .S .  could 
take a deferential posture toward the IASB, as the audit firms are 
suggesting, or it could follow the European Union and reserve a right to 
endorse or veto new IFRS promulgations, standard-by-standard. The 
former choice sacrifices accountability and potentially, national 
economic interests, while the latter holds out a sacrifice of 
comparability. 
If the U .S .  takes a standard-by-standard approach, the Roadmap, in 
the end, delivers us to a revised domestic politics of standard setting. As 
1 3 1 .  See TRUST EES,  INT'L ACCOUNTL 'G STA NDARDS COM M .  FOUND . •  C"ANGES IN THE 
CO;-'!STITUTION: REPORT OF Ti l E  IASC FOU�Di\TION TRUSTEES ON PART 1 or T H E I R  REVIEW 5 (2009), 
availahle af http://www .ifrs.orgINRlrdol1 lyres/573E48C3-52 1 C-449E-985 F-9A 7 1 3 1  CDAC 1 7/0/ 
COl1stitutiol1 ReviewP 1 May09.pdf 
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each new standard comes down the production line, the SEC either 
backs IFRS and lives with dissent at pol itical cost or resolves the 
conflict by opting out of the IFRS treatment and promulgating its own 
standard with a consequent sacrifice of comparabi lity and increase in 
compliance costs . 
A posture of deference avoids these problems, but only in theory . In 
practice, every time the IASB proves wil ling to go forward with a 
standard over U .S .  objections, whether articulated by management, 
users, or the SEC, a domestic question concerning the national interest 
in compliance will  arise, with the question once again implicating a 
trade off between the U .S .  interest implicated and comparability .  In 
light of the contentious history of GAAP, it is fair to predict that the 
comparabi lity line inevitably will be crossed. Given this ,  one wonders 
whether deference is politically tenable at the get go considering the 
nebulous monitoring structure instituted by the IASCF. Deference 
would put U .S .  interests into the hands of a transnational standard-setter 
whose independence is c louded by financial insecurity and whose publ ic  
accountability l ies with a monitoring board on which the SEC holds only 
one seat and whose powers are advisory only. Such a set-up will not sit 
easy with U . S .  issuers, users, or politicians. 
In the end, all roads on the Roadmap lead to the same end point-a 
reconstituted domestic politics of accounting standard setting. 
Assuming that the SEC adopts IFRS in whole, how long will it then take 
before domestic interests coalesce trumping a new IASB standard? 
Whether this happens sooner or later, it will  indeed happen, and when it 
does the U .S .  IFRS wi l l  begin a long, painful process of reveliing to 
U . S .  GAAP. Given this projection, convergence emerges a relative 
rather than an absolute proposition. So the policy question is this :  What 
is the most feasible degree of convergence? This, in turn, suggests that 
we would be better off sticking with the F ASB and the painstaking 
GAAP-IFRS convergence process. 
CONCLUSION 
The SEC announced the Roadmap ' s pending appearance in August 
2008, only to delay its re lease unti l  November 2008 .  The financial 
system col lapsed between the two dates, with negative implications for 
globalization imperatives. Matters, such as loss of l isting business to 
foreign markets and issuer comparabil ity in global markets, loom less 
large when securities issuers and regulators have more pressing 
economic problems . Issuer comment letters expressing cost concems 
underscore the point, concerns now brought forward in the SEC ' s  new 
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Work Plan .  
Out-of-pocket costs are not the only factor weighing in GAAP's  
favor. The SEC that produced the Roadmap made the classic mistake of 
a regulator grappling with business lost due to jurisdictional 
competition. The earl ier global domination of U . S .  equity markets gave 
the U .S .  the privilege of imposing its own tenns on foreign entities. 1 32 
Unfortunately, the U .S .  can no longer do this .  A choice is posed­
should the U . S .  continue to go i ts own regulatory way or instead 
reconstitute its markets so as to catch the at-the-margin consumers now 
listing securities elsewhere? It is important that the regulator addressing 
the choice avoids panic 1 33  and takes a capacious view of the costs and 
benefits. The past cannot be recaptured; something has to be sacrificed. 
The regulator also needs to remember that the presence of regulatory 
competition in the fact pattern does not, by itself, imply a policy result . 
Competition in a global securities market does not have the same 
economic properties as competition in a market for widgets. Regulation 
markets are compl icated places where costs and benefits do not 
automatically signal catering to the marginal consumer. Protecting 
domestic markets must be weighed against global market share and 
reduction of global market frictions . 
The SEC, instead of facing the issues, suffered a global panic attack, 
tnmcating its cost-benefit calculus to focus only on interests at the 
global level .  I ts new "Work Plan" signals that the panic has passed but 
without guaranteeing that the matter wil l  be determined in a context free 
of scare talk and false global policy imperatives. 
Meanwhile, the IASB, emboldened by the Roadmap, is starting to 
show its true colors . Two weeks before the SEC released its \-York Plan, 
the IASB 's  overs ight board announced that it would "emphasise that 
convergence is a strategy aimed at promoting and faci litating the 
adoption of IFRS, but it is not an objective by itself. ,, 1 34 In other words, 
the IASB sees no reason to implement new standards to cater to 
American tastes in financial reporting, tastes not shared among the 
preparers on its present roster of constituents. Unfortunately for the 
IASB, a report in the Financial Times read this as abandonment of the 
convergence objective. There followed a quick retraction by Gerrit 
1 3 2 .  See generally Chris Brummer, Stoc/.: Excl!clIIges and the N"l\' Mar/.:et ./iJr Securities LUll' ,  75 
U .  C l i i .  L .  REV. 1 4 35 (2 009) 
1 3 3 .  C!, William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Nell '  Economics oj JIII'isdiCliollal 
Competition ' Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L .J .  20 I ,  264 .. ·65 ( 1 997)  
(describing "scare talk" deployments of jurisdictional competit ion theory). 
1 3 4 .  Rachel Sanderson, IASB Sojiens Stance 011 Convergellce. FIN. TIMES ( London ) ,  Feb. I S , 
20 I 0, (/I'ailahle at http ://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/9acO l cde- ] a36- 1 1 df-b4ee-
00 I 44feab49a.htm ]?nclick_ check= I .  
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Zalm, the Chairman of the Trustees of the IASC Foundat ion, 1 35 but the 
take-it-or-Ieave-it point had been made. The S EC's  subsequent release 
of the Work P lan, with i ts  emphasis on further cooperation by the lASB, 
lobs the ball  back over the net. The game' s  outcome is anybody ' s  guess 
at this point. 
The damage done by the Roadmap is there for al l  to see. The SEC 
withdrew its support for the F ASB-lASB convergence process. Now it 
confronts persuasive reassertions of desirabi lity of the convergence 
process in its own comment fi le even as the lASB, taking a cue from the 
Roadmap, signals its disinterest in convergence. How is the SEC to 
retrace its steps at this point? 
A convergence process, by definition, entails adjustments on both 
sides. That means bargaining, a process undercut when the Roadmap 
pulled the trumps from the national hand. It is not too late to restore 
them:  the SEC should veer off the Roadmap and return to its base in 
GAAP. That accomplished, the FASB and the lASB can return to the 
table to work toward a feasible degree of convergence.  
1 3 5 .  See Press Release, Int ' l  Fin .  Reporting Standards, Trustees Clar ify Posi t ion o n  I F RS 
Adoption Ohjective and SUppOl1 for Convergence (Feb. 1 6 , 20 1 0), available al http ://www . iasb.org/ 
News/A ll noun cc mcn ts+ and + S peec h es/Tru steesc lln vergcn ces up port . h tm. 
